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Security: synaptiai/auracle

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Report a vulnerability

Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. Report it privately through GitHub instead: open a security advisory. Only you, the maintainers and anyone they add to the advisory can read it. If that form is unavailable, email support@synapti.ai instead.

Include the commit you tested, the steps that reproduce the fault, and what an attacker gains. Remove every real credential and all customer data first.

The maintainers confirm the report, agree on a fix with you, and publish an advisory with the fix. They credit you in the advisory unless you ask otherwise.

Supported versions

Fixes land on main and ship in the next release. An earlier release gets no fix of its own.

What the default setup does not protect

The defaults suit a local checkout on one machine. Each item below needs a decision from you before anything reaches a network.

  • The webhook verifies nothing by default. With WEBHOOK_SECRET empty, it accepts every request. It binds 127.0.0.1 unless WEBHOOK_HOST names another interface. Set the secret before you expose the webhook.
  • The webhook and the console refuse a blank interface. Node binds every interface for an empty host, so WEBHOOK_HOST= or CONSOLE_HOST= stops the process instead.
  • The console authenticates nobody itself. It trusts the header that CONSOLE_IDENTITY_HEADER names, and serves only a reviewer on the roster (DEC-42, DEC-45). Put it behind a proxy that sets that header and strips any copy a client sends. In the stack docker-compose.dev.yml runs, it shares a network with the ledger alone. No other container can send it that header. Every process on the host can reach the published port, though.
  • Every published port trusts every local user of the host. A local user can approve replies through the console. The same user can submit tickets through a webhook with no secret. They can also log in to the ledger with the compose password, and the test mail server accepts any login. On a shared host, let only the proxy reach the console and set WEBHOOK_SECRET. Replace the compose passwords. The test profile and its mail server are for a single-user machine. On a shared host, stop the server once the tests finish: docker compose --profile test stop mail.
  • Every published port binds 127.0.0.1. The compose files keep the ledger, the mail server, the webhook and the console off other machines. Change a binding only when a proxy stands in front of the port.
  • The compose passwords are public. The ledger's password is auracle. The password of auracle_reader, the read-only role, is auracle_reader. Set AURACLE_DB_PASSWORD and AURACLE_READER_PASSWORD in the host's .env to replace them. Postgres reads the ledger's password once, when it creates its data volume. So set it before the first up, or change the role's password as well. Use URL-safe characters only, because the stack's URLs carry both passwords unencoded. openssl rand -hex 24 makes one. A process you start from a checkout reads DATABASE_URL, so put the same password there too.
  • Every daemon connects as the ledger's superuser. The compose ledger's only role besides auracle_reader is auracle, a superuser. A fault that lets a request run SQL therefore runs it with every right. Give each daemon a role of its own before you expose one.
  • Every daemon in the stack docker-compose.dev.yml runs reads the whole .env. So the webhook holds OPENROUTER_API_KEY and the mailbox password, though it needs neither. Keep that file to the values the stack needs.
  • The ledger stores customer message text. The README section on the compliance position says where, and what you own as the data controller.

There aren't any published security advisories