BoundaryLab

Bounded middleware, from app clients to a source-built Android 16 system image.

5 hosted lanes passed (recorded run) · Apache-2.0

Architecture illustration. Every execution claim below links to retained receipts.

Use as a library · Evidence gallery · Run locally · Architecture · Delivery board

Embed a bounded file-hashing broker in Android/Flutter apps, reuse its core in a JVM application, or integrate the generated-only native service host into a custom Android image. Install and configure the libraries.

Built and tested on a real Linux AOSP server

On 30 October 2026, we built and booted the pinned Android 16 source baseline, then a custom native-service image, on a Google Cloud Linux x86_64 server with KVM. The host ran Ubuntu 24.04 with 16 vCPU, 64 GiB nominal RAM (62.8 GiB reported) and a 500 GiB SSD workspace. This was source-built Android running in Cuttlefish on that server. Host/KVM receipts · Allocated host inventory

The original native compiler log records the Linux host directly:

HOST_OS=linux
HOST_OS_EXTRA=Linux-7.0.0-1014-gcp-x86_64-Ubuntu-24.04.5-LTS

Pinned source: android-16.0.0_r4 · Target: aosp_cf_x86_64_only_phone-bp4a-userdebug · Executed overlay: 444ae29.

Recorded proof layer	Final result	Inspect the evidence
Operator checks	34 / 34 passed	Source, image, boot and cleanup aggregate
Harness observations	236 / 236 passed	Real Binder/lifecycle checks
Distinct native assertions	61 / 61 passed	Original command and stdout

These are separate layers; observations include repeated checks. Native assertions ran under permissive su. Live authorized Binder calls used UID 2000 / boundarylab_probe; the service and both probe domains were nonpermissive in the loaded SELinux policy.

Animated evidence replay — not a live recording. Derived from retained commands and results. Static poster · Replay transcript and provenance · Original execution evidence

Watch the 28-second recorded-evidence replay

Animated evidence replay — not a live recording. Collapse this panel to return to the static view. Read the transcript.

Actual service execution

The AOSP component is a headless native Binder service. Its useful evidence is the work it executed and the callers it rejected.

Authorized caller, UID 2000: submitted one generated byte (0x00); the service returned the expected SHA-256 digest.

{"case":"known_job_succeeded","passed":true,"detail":"6e340b9cffb37a989ca544e6bb780a2c78901d3fb33738768511a30617afa01d"}

Recorded request, caller identity and returned digest

Unauthorized caller, UID 9999: received the typed DENIED result.

I/BoundaryLabProbe( 4371): {"case":"denied","passed":true,"detail":"DENIED"}

Recorded denied-client identity and response

Separate native engine execution: all 61 assertion cases passed under the recorded su identity.

{"summary":"PASS","checks":61}

Original native command and complete stdout · Source baseline build/boot receipts · Supporting boot-capture archive

Execution pipeline diagram. Actual Soong API update/freeze → native build → image build → runtime receipts.

The added AOSP components are a native C++ facade, frozen AIDL V1, a dedicated system_ext Binder daemon, init definitions and SELinux rules. This profile supports generated SHA-256 work; file jobs return UNSUPPORTED. The Java framework, system_server and kernel are unchanged. Layer ownership and source

Open the results, cost and recorded-run timeline charts

Receipt-derived results. The 61 native assertions used permissive su; the three BoundaryLab domains were nonpermissive. Short restart and quiescent FD observations do not establish performance or soak. Underlying results.

Estimated infrastructure US$6.17; US$11.44 including egress allowance and tax/FX reserve. Final invoice unavailable. Server and both disks were verified deleted at 22:41:46 UTC on 30 October 2026. Cost calculation and teardown receipts.

Historical execution timeline. Five failed runtime attempts and their exact corrections remain preserved. All visuals and sources.

A useful example: inspection attachments that can be checked

FieldPack helps a recipient catch changed or missing attachments before working from the wrong files. It demonstrates process isolation, bounded work and explicit recovery when a worker disappears.

An inspector selects attachments in the native Android or Flutter client. A separate Android application broker hashes them; the client explicitly exports a SHA-256 manifest. The recipient receives the manifest and attachments separately, then verifies a local directory through a separate desktop JVM host or the Python reference.

Native Android — actual export	Flutter — actual export

Both clients exported the same 299-byte manifest. Separate JVM and Python recipient implementations agreed on all five outcomes: matching, changed, truncated, missing and unsupported symlink—10 JVM and 10 Python cases across the two exports. Original handoff results · Observed broker-loss defect and verified fix

Architecture diagram. FieldPack uses the application broker; the native AOSP profile is a separate integration. File/job contract · Wire contract.

Try FieldPack locally

Requires Git and Python 3.10+ on macOS or Linux/POSIX. Uses only the standard library; after cloning, the reference demo runs offline.

git clone https://github.com/oudaykhaled/boundarylab.git
cd boundarylab
python3 examples/fieldpack/demo.py

The demo creates a manifest from three owned fixtures, verifies copied files, changes a byte, removes an attachment and rejects an unsupported format. Its expected final marker is PASS: all expected outcomes and exit codes observed. This single-process reference runs independently of the recorded AOSP image. Walkthrough and custom files

Use BoundaryLab in another project

Reuse the existing bounded SHA-256 engine and FieldPack codec without including this checkout's Gradle source projects. The core is a JVM 17 JAR; the Android SDK is an API 30+ AAR that talks to a separately installed broker. Flutter consumes the same AAR. Local Maven coordinates are dev.boundarylab:boundarylab-core:0.1.0-SNAPSHOT and dev.boundarylab:boundarylab-android:0.1.0-SNAPSHOT; this is local/private distribution, with no Maven Central or pub.dev release claimed.

The library guide covers publication, independent JVM and Android consumers, Flutter setup, and a custom broker package. Approved Android clients and broker must share signing identity and declare the broker's exact signature permission. The native OS host is a separate, generated-only custom-image integration; current source additions do not inherit the recorded image's execution results. Generated SHA-256 and FieldPack remain the available workloads; a substantive new capability requires its own design, implementation and evidence.

Explore or build an implementation

Goal	Start here
Native Android application and broker	Native client · Binder broker · Kotlin SDK
Flutter application and plugin	Flutter consumer · Flutter SDK
Separate-process desktop host and CLI	Desktop quickstart · Conformance results
Native AOSP source integration	AOSP profile · Layer diagram

Pinned application toolchains and local check commands

JDK 17, Android SDK 36 / build-tools 35.0.0, Gradle 8.13, AGP 8.11.1 and Kotlin 2.2.21; Flutter 3.38.9 / Dart 3.10.8. Desktop file support needs a trusted local C compiler. Android installation minimum is API 30; actual local device evidence is API 36.

python3 scripts/verify-wrapper.py
python3 scripts/check.py reference
python3 scripts/check.py jvm
python3 scripts/check.py android
python3 scripts/check-flutter.py

These commands check/build applications; they do not install a device or provision AOSP infrastructure. The local Flutter receipts record the equivalent direct Dart analyzer used where the wrapper analyzer was incomplete; CI uses the complete pinned SDK.

Broker and both Android consumers must have matching signing certificates. Build them with the same local signing setup or use the matched three-APK CI bundle. The separately signed denial fixture is intentionally rejected. Build/runtime quality report

Evidence, scope and next work

The engineering prototype has actual app, desktop and AOSP execution evidence. 393 selected host cases and 31 physical-device cases passed at the recorded application source, with one hardlink fixture explicitly unavailable; those counts are separate from the AOSP proof above. Quality report · Current requirement evidence · AI acceptance audit

Work is bounded: 32 flat aliases, 128 MiB per file and pack, 64 KiB reads, 16 KiB manifest, fixed resource caps and one worker. Jobs and sessions are volatile; process loss requires a fresh epoch and explicit resubmission. Matching hashes establish byte consistency. Security and supported file profile

Open: compatibility evolution/old consumers, controlled performance and peak-resource measurement, the two-hour soak, fresh final-image reproduction and other declared roadmap acceptance. The baseline's incremental-build/sandbox history and failed custom attempts remain inspectable. No production release, commercial adoption or independent execution authenticity is claimed.

Architecture decisions · 40-task plan and status · 22-item role evidence matrix · Original animated proposal · Contributing · Evidence policy

Created and maintained by Ouday Khaled. Apache-2.0.